Introduction
In the whole of human history there has never been a phenomenon comparable to the advances in science and technology which started at the beginning of the scientific revolution in the 17th Century and are continuing today at an accelerating rate. But impressive as these developments have been we cannot be complacent about them. In fact as a society we are not as intellectually sophisticated or mature as we would like to think we are. Even in this 21st Century we are subject to influences which can impair or corrupt the doing or application of science. And that is the case especially in the field of environmental science.
I shall be discussing three kinds of such influences. First, the corruption of science by dogma or ideology; secondly, misconceptions about the nature and methodology of science; thirdly, a version of the precautionary principle which is a product of a combination of both those vices.
Dogma and Ideology in Science
Dogma is one of the oldest and most insidious threats to the advancement of science. Famous examples include the church forcing Galileo to recant his claim that the earth is not the centre of the world but moves around the sun – an injunction the church imposed not because it had scientific evidence to the contrary but simply because Galileo’s assertion was in conflict with the doctrines of the church.
In same way in the 19th century the violent opposition to Darwin’s theory of the origin of species by natural selection was not based upon scientific argument but was derived from religious doctrine. And that conflict between science and religion is still with us today. In the United States especially there is continuing debate about attempts by schools to give the teaching of creationism the same status as the teaching of evolution.
I make no comment about the place of religion in the lives of human beings or upon the right of churches, schools or parents to promote or pass on religious beliefs. The point I am making is that religious beliefs and scientific reasoning occupy quite distinct domains which should not be confused with each other and that when they are confused science is corrupted.
It is not only religious dogma which threatens science. The doing of science is corrupted when it is influenced by any ideology or belief system which is based upon values as opposed to reasoning or evidence. For example it was not only religious but social doctrine which militated against acceptance of Darwin’s theory. As the wife of the Canon of Worcester Cathedral cried out upon being informed that the theory implied the descent of man from apelike creatures, “Descended from the apes! My dear, we hope it is not true. But if it is, let us pray that it may not become generally known!” While that story may be apocryphal it does reflect another form of opposition to Darwin’s theory which was based on the dogma of man being a unique and superior species.
A more recent example of the malign influence of ideology upon science occurred in the 1940’s when scientists in the Soviet Union were forced to accept Denisovich Lysenko’s fallacious theories about the inheritance of acquired characteristics – not because they satisfied the criteria of scientific acceptability but because they supported the particular form of Marxism favoured by Josef Stalin. That was a particularly serious episode, it resulting in the persecution of geneticists who disagreed and the discrediting of Soviet biology and agricultural science for a generation.
Those examples are not isolated curiosities in the history of ideas. The influence of ideology upon science is still very much alive today.
In a major work which has just been published, Science and Public Policy: the Virtuous Corruption of Virtual Environmental Science, Professor Aynsley Kellow convincingly demonstrates the existence of what he calls “the virtuous corruption” of environmental science by which he means the corruption of science in order to serve what is seen as a good cause. “Lysenkoism might appear to be a rather extreme example of social and political factors influencing the conduct of science” he observes, “but” he continues “there is ample evidence that much of the science relating to environmental problems is at least at risk of being contaminated by similar influences.”
One of Professor Kellow’s many telling examples is the saga of the listing by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources of a sort of mountain goat named pseudonovibos spiralis as an endangered species. In fact, as Kellow comments, the IUCN’s assessment of the risk of extinction of the species “surprised many scholars because there is every indication that pseudonovibos spiralis was more than extinct - that it had not just ceased to exist, but that it never had existed”. It is in short a mythical animal. But despite that it remains on the list because its existence, Professor Kellow suggests, serves other agendas such as supporting arguments for the preservation of habitats. Incidentally, asserting the reality of this mythical creature also serves the interests of the Cambodian traders who sell fake pseudonovibos horns to gullible collectors and locals who believe it protects them against the effects of snakebite.
Even when we enter the apparently value free domain of mathematics we find that science is subject to ideological influences.
In a recently published work rather challengingly entitled useless arithmetic Why Environmental Scientists Can’t Predict the Future the authors cite many examples where quantitative mathematical modelling has been corrupted by ideology. They include the Club of Rome’s 1972 publication Limits to Growth which used modelling to support their prediction that by the year 2000 societies around the world would be subject to catastrophic breakdown as a result of the total exhaustion of natural resources and massive environmental destruction. That is more than an example of the failure of a grossly defective model – although it certainly was that- it as an example of the corruption of science because of the telling comment made by a Club of Rome official shortly after the report was released that the idea was “to get a message across, and to make people aware of the impending crisis." “In other words” the authors of Useless Arithmetic comment, “the model outcome had been determined before the model was run. Finding the truth according to a preconceived opinion or philosophy is a common flaw in applied mathematical modelling. And it is very similar to finding truth that matches one's religious faith.”
The authors cite numerous other examples to support their conclusions that many modelling studies are politicized, that their authors are “not unlike religious fanatics” and that many of those engaged in mathematical modelling are very defensive about their work with the result that it is not subject to “the usual broad based vigorous debate criticism and constant attempts at falsification that characterize good science”.
In the work I have already cited Professor Kellow presents a fully supported case for concluding that “The extensive reliance” (in climate science) “upon models and the significant manipulation of their source data creates the danger of virtuous corruption, just as the values of those who wish to push policy prescriptions onto policy-makers and the public can (even if inadvertently) contaminate the conduct of their analysis”.
A serious example of the misuse of models in order to produce a politically correct result occurred in 1992 when the Unite States Environment Protection Agency used a model to support its claims that environmental or “second hand” tobacco smoke was a class A carcinogen causing several thousand deaths a year in the United States. In subsequent judicial proceedings the EPA study was declared to be void on the grounds that the methodology had been adjusted and data had been selectively used or rejected so as to ensure that the model supported the conclusion the Agency was promoting and which it had reached before the study was undertaken. That decision was later set aside on appeal but only on the technical issue of the judge’s jurisdiction to review the EPA report: his findings were not impugned; but to this day the claims made by the EPA are cited to support claims about the effects of second hand smoke. I am not making any comment about the effects of second hand smoke but studies like that seriously impair proper consideration of the issue. Indeed, if, as other evidence appears to indicate, environmental tobacco smoke does pose a health risk, flawed studies such as the EPA study are seriously counterproductive to efforts to combat it.
Another way in which science is corrupted by ideology is to be found in the bizarre application by post modern theorists of scientific conclusions to quite inappropriate disciplines. Examples include the application by post modernists of mathematical logic to political theory, Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity to sociological questions, non Euclidian geometry to a special space in which wars are said to be conducted and the application of chaos theory to literary analysis. It is hard to believe that anyone can advance this sort of thing with a straight face but they are deadly serious about it and post modern thinking continues to be influential.
The advancement and application of science are also adversely affected when ideology distorts the way in which scientific issues are discussed and dealt with by the public and by decision makers.
Ideological positions are imbedded in the emotional and value laden language used in environmental debate. Take the description by the sub-editor of an English tabloid newspaper of products derived from genetically modified crops as "Frankenstein Food"; he probably felt quite proud of himself – after all, the headline was eye-catching and alliterative to boot. But one could hardly imagine a journalistic approach better calculated to arouse fear and prejudice and inhibit clear thinking about genetic modification. For millions of people, every time the issue of genetic modification of crops is raised Frankenstein Food will pop into their minds. Expressions and language like that – and there are many other examples - might be acceptable in social debate or when you are trying to convey feelings or persuade people of something but they have no place in serious science based discussions.
As another illustration of the ideological distortion of debate about scientific issues consider the reaction to the work The Skeptical Environmentalist written by a Danish scholar Bjørn Lomborg. Published for the first time in English in 2001, the work deals with environmental concerns about the depletion of natural resources, the effects of human population growth, the loss of biodiversity and the pollution of water and the atmosphere. In a 500 page analysis of the evidence, Lomborg argues that these fears are either unfounded or exaggerated.
I do not express any opinion as to whether or not Lomborg’s thesis is valid. But what I do wish to comment on is the way in which his thesis has been debated. The response to the Skeptical Environmentalist has been very disturbing. Much of it consists of attacks on Lomborg personally. But Lomborg does not rely upon his qualifications or personal opinions to sustain his case – his work stands or falls on the evidence and the arguments he advances; it follows that the personal attacks on him are gratuitous, irrelevant and of course quite unscientific. But even when it is the book rather than the man which is being addressed the way in which the issues he raises have been discussed has been just as unedifying and unhelpful.
A review of the book was published in the journal Nature. In that review which was later fairly characterised by correspondents to the journal as “peevish” and “part of a rush to rubbish Lomborg’s book”, the authors expressed the conclusion that Lomborg’s survey “reads like a compilation of form papers from one of those classes from hell where one has to fail all the students”. It is a troubling indication of the depths to which debate about environmental issues has descended when it is thought appropriate to include puerile material like that in what purports to be a serious review of a serious book in one of the most prestigious scientific journals in the world.
Similarly in the case of Lomborg’s book the Scientific American decided to depart from its usual practice of publishing one-page book reviews written with detachment by recognised experts in the field and instead published a special eleven page section on the book written by academics known to be associated with environmental advocacy. Their articles were not balanced reviews but polemical attacks which were accurately summarised by The Economist as “strong on contempt and sneering, but weak on substance”.
Not all Lomborg’s critics used verbal abuse. In September 2001 at the launch of Lomborg’s book in an Oxford bookshop Mark Lynas, a widely published writer on climate change decided to present his thoughtful, scholarly conclusions about the book by smashing a pie in Lomborg’s face.
That the personal attacks on Lomborg and the partial and intemperate reviews of his book represent a serious departure from the norms of scientific debate and academic behavior is bad enough in itself but by perverting proper debate about the issues which he raises the most serious casualty is science itself.
Misconceptions about the nature and methodology of science
I turn to the second trend which is subverting the doing and application of science: a failure to understand the essential nature and limitations of science and its methodology.
The phenomenal growth of scientific knowledge has given rise to an exaggerated belief in the capacity of science to provide us with complete and conclusive answers to questions about almost every aspect of our society. Increasingly the media, consumers, decision makers and the general community are demanding clear cut unequivocal answers to questions about everything from climate change, dietary requirements or genetically engineered crops to the efficacy of a new drug. But what they fail to appreciate is that certainty in science is a myth and that all scientific statements are provisional only being no more than the best fit for the data as they are currently known so that it is simply not possible to give unqualified answers to questions of that kind. An example is provided by the popular response to the publication of the Fourth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The Report makes numerous references to uncertainties in the data and incomplete understanding of the phenomena which are the subject of the report and very properly expresses reservations about the extent to which the projections in the report can be used to predict climate change and future sea level rise but those uncertainties and qualifications have been barely mentioned in the media or public debate about the report.
Unfortunately it is not only non scientists who perpetuate the myth of certainty in science. Some scientists themselves, through the confidence with which and the unqualified terms in which they express their opinions or report the results of their research, bear just as much responsibility for perpetuating this misconception of science. That has been exacerbated by the readiness of some scientists to announce research findings to the popular media before they have been published in academic journals or been critically examined by other scientists.
Another example of a failure to understand the nature and the limits of science is an exaggerated belief in the capacity of mathematical models –usually computer generated- to provide us with knowledge of the world.
There is no doubt that modelling is a very useful tool. lt would be hard to find any field today which does not rely upon some form of modelling. Models can generate hypotheses which night not be conceived if we were to rely solely on human reasoning and imagination, they can facilitate research and design and they can enable analyses of data to be undertaken that would otherwise be virtually impossible. Indeed in the general sense of it being a technique which involves the representation or mapping and manipulation of a manageable sub-division of the physical world a great deal of science can be seen in essence as a form of modelling.
But like science generally there is a widespread failure to understand the limitations of mathematical modelling.
A basic but common error is to forget that a model is not real. That sounds an obvious thing to say but it needs to be said because the output of models is routinely presented in such a way as to suggest that the thing represented by the model is the thing itself. Thus one frequently reads in the popular media and even in the scientific literature statements to the effect that a model or simulation “proves” or “shows” that something in the physical world is the case. But such assertions are self evidently unsound. By definition all models are incomplete; and the validity of the output of a model is dependent entirely upon the soundness of the data and the validity of the assumptions upon which it is based. Strictly speaking the only statements which a model can make are statements about itself. A model can be a useful tool but only when it is used in conjunction with empirically based science.
At the root of the problem is a failure to understand that mathematical modelling is a qualitatively different activity from the methodology of observation, measurement, analysis, experiment and the making of falsifiable predictions about the real world which comprise the doing of science.
In the work to which I have already referred Useless Arithmetic the authors present a convincing case showing how inadequate mathematical modelling has proved to be in dealing with complex systems. The problems, they argue, do not just reflect defects in the particular models they cite but are endemic to the modelling of any complex environmental or human process. They support their case by an analysis of the inadequacies of some two dozen quantitative modelling studies ranging from shore line erosion rates to global sea level change.
It is not only in respect of complex systems that over reliance is placed upon modelling. A dramatic example was provided by the design of the Millennium pedestrian bridge across the Thames. This magnificent structure had to be closed two days after it had been opened because the synchronised responses of pedestrians to random movements in the bridge set up dangerous oscillations. The failure to predict this phenomenon was a direct result of the designers relying upon predictions made by computer models of the behavior of pedestrians on the bridge instead of their making empirical investigations of the behavior of real human beings on a real bridge.
The precautionary principle
The third example of influences which impair the doing or application of environmental science is the lack of intellectual discipline coupled with ideology which is reflected in the formulation and application of the precautionary principle.
The precautionary principle is frequently referred to in discussions about environmental issues and in regulatory regimes governing environmentally sensitive activities. But a threshold problem about applying the principle is that it is routinely referred to as if it had a single universally accepted meaning. But it does not. When it first gained currency the principle was generally understood to mean that where proposed activity might cause irreversible environmental harm a lack of full scientific certainty is not a sufficient reason for not taking measures to guard against that harm. But over the years the principle has been given a number of different formulations in international agreements and in legislation and policy statements. Some formulations make the principle applicable where harm is possible while others make it applicable where harm is probable – two very different tests. Other formulations, including the well known Rio Declaration, introduce the notion of cost effectiveness into the application of the principle.
The fact that the principle is given different formulations doesn’t invalidate it but it does mean that to be meaningful the principle has to be defined in the terms of the particular context in which it is being used. But unfortunately in discussions about environmental issues you will routinely hear the expression precautionary principle being used without it being defined, with the result that the discussions are confusing and unproductive.
There is a more serious problem with the application of the precautionary principle. The form of the principle most commonly advanced by environmentalists is that no activity should be undertaken unless it can be demonstrated that that activity will not cause environmental harm. At first sight that appears to be a reasonably defensible proposition but when it is analysed it in fact turns out that it is impossible to comply with. Until we know everything about everything in the universe it is a logical impossibility to prove a negative of that kind. That is brought home to us when we reflect upon complex or chaotic systems which are sensitively dependent upon initial conditions and in which even the most limited action is capable of generating large and unpredictable effects. In other words, we can never prove conclusively that a particular action will not have an adverse consequence somewhere in the world at some time in the future. It follows that that form of the precautionary principle precludes us from ever doing anything at all again.
In case it is thought that I am being extravagant in my characterisation of where the application of that form of the precautionary principle leads us let me cite a concrete example.
I return to my reference to the inclusion by the IUCN of the mythical horned mountain goat pseudonovibos spiralis as an endangered species. By 2003 the IUCN had reached the point where it could no longer ignore the expressions of doubt that were increasingly being voiced about the reality of this creature. But that did not result in it removing it from the list; instead the IUCN invoked “the precautionary principle” which they concluded “requires us to assume that the species did exist and may still exist”. So there you have it: this most serviceable principle can be used to deem the existence of any species you choose, mythical or otherwise, which you cannot conclusively prove does not exist.
In these comments I am not arguing against the concept of some kind of precautionary principle: of course we should be circumspect about taking action which might have irreversible environmental consequences. But if the principle is to be invoked it must be defined and applied in an intellectually disciplined way in the terms of the particular domain in respect of which it is being invoked.
Conclusion
I am not suggesting that the doing or understanding of science is universally flawed. In relation to the great bulk of science that is not the case. But the examples I have given are sufficient to show that we cannot be complacent either.
It is intrinsically harmful when any field of intellectual endeavor is misapplied or is distorted by dogma or ideology or its scope or methodology are not properly understood, but it is especially harmful in the case of science. The resolution of social issues and the development of Government policy are today more dependent upon science than has ever been the case before. Predicting and responding to climate change, resolving issues relating to genetic engineering, planning the management of water, energy and natural resources and determining policies in areas ranging from ageing and health care to defence or telecommunications are just a few examples of fields where the input of science is an essential component of the decision making process.
That is why it is important that we confront the sort of issues to which I have referred and that is why the philosophical approach of the Australian Skeptics has never been more important than it is today.